1. OCELLUS LUCANUS - ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE.
2. TAURUS, THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER, - ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD.
3. JULIUS FIRMICUS MATERNUS OF THE THEMA MUNDI;
IN WHICH THE POSITIONS OF THE STARS AT THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE SEVERAL MUNDANE
PERIODS IS GIVEN.
4. SELECT THEOREMS ON THE PERPETUITY OF TIME, BY PROCLUS.
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINALS BY
THOMAS TAYLOR.
The knowledge of divine and the most honourable things, is the principle and cause and rule of human felicity. - Archytas.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATOR; AND SOLD BY JOHN BOHN,
HENRIETTA-STREET; HENRY BOHN, YORK-STREET;
AND THOMAS RODD, GREAT NEWPORT-STREET.
MDCCCXXXI.
PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.
OCELLUS LUCANUS
ON THE UNIVERSE.
CHAPTER 1.
Ocellus Lucanus has written what follows concerning the Nature of the Universe; having learnt some things through clear arguments from Nature herself, but others from opinion, in conjunction with reason, it being his intention [in this work] to derive what is probable from intellectual perception.
It appears, therefore, to me, that the Universe is indestructible and unbegotten, since it always was, and always will be; for if it had a temporal beginning, it would not have always existed: thus, therefore, the universe is unbegotten and indestructible; for if some one should opine that it was once generated, he would not be able to find anything into which it can be corrupted and dissolved, since that from which it was generated would be the first part of the universe; and again, that into which it would be dissolved would be the last part of it.
But if the universe was generated, it was generated together with all things; and if it should be corrupted, it would be corrupted together with all things. This, however, is impossible. The universe, therefore, is without a beginning, and without an end; nor is it possible that it can have any other mode of subsistence.
To which may be added, that everything which has received a beginning of generation, and which ought also to participate of dissolution, receives two mutations; one of which, indeed, proceeds from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; and that from which it begins to change is denominated generation, but that at which it at length arrives, is called acme. The other mutation, however, proceeds from the greater to the less, and from the better to the worse: but the termination of this mutation is denominated corruption and dissolution.
If, therefore, the whole and the universe were generated, and are corruptible, they must, when generated, have been changed from the less to the greater, and from the worse to the better; but when corrupted, they must be changed from the greater to the less, and from the better to the worse. Hence, if the world was generated, it would receive increase, and would arrive at its acme; and again, it would afterwards receive decrease and an end. For every nature which has a progression, possesses three boundaries and two intervals. The three boundaries, therefore, are generation, acme, and end; but the intervals are, the progression from generation to acme, and from acme to the end.
The whole, however, and the universe, affords, as from itself, no indication of a thing of this kind; for neither do we perceive it rising into existence, or becoming to be, nor changing to the better and the greater, nor becoming at a certain time worse or less; but it always continues to subsist in the same and a similar manner, and is itself perpetually equal and similar to itself.
Of the truth of this, the orders of things, their symmetry, figurations, positions, intervals, powers, swiftness and slowness with respect to each other; and, besides these, their numbers and temporal periods, are clear signs and indications. For all such things as these receive mutation and diminution, conformably to the course of a generated nature: for things that are greater and better acquire acme through power, but those that are less and worse are corrupted through imbecility of nature.
I denominate, however, the whole and the universe, the whole world; for, in consequence of being adorned with all things, it has obtained this appellation; since it is from itself a consummate and perfect system of the nature of all things; for there is nothing external to the universe, since whatever exists is contained in the universe, and the universe subsists together with this, comprehending in itself all things, some as parts, but others as supervenient.
Those things, therefore, which are comprehended in the world, have a congruity with the world; but the world has no concinnity with anything else, but is itself co-harmonized with itself. For all other things have not a consummate or self-perfect subsistence, but require congruity with things external to themselves. Thus animals require a conjunction with air for the purpose of respiration, but sight with light, in order to see; and the other senses with something else, in order to perceive their peculiar sensible object. A conjunction with the earth also is necessary to the germination of plants. The sun and moon, the planets, and the fixed stars, have likewise a coalescence with the world, as being parts of its common arrangement. The world, however, has not a conjunction with anything else than itself.
Further still, what has been said will be easily known to be true from the following considerations. Fire, which imparts heat to another thing, is itself from itself hot; and honey, which is sweet to the taste, is itself from itself sweet. The principles likewise of demonstrations, which are indicative of things unapparent, are themselves from themselves manifest and known. Thus, also, that which becomes to other things the cause of self-perfection, is itself from itself perfect; and that which becomes to other things the cause of preservation and permanency, is itself from itself preserved and permanent. That, likewise, which becomes to other things the cause of concinnity, is itself from itself co-harmonized; but the world is to other things the cause of their existence, preservation, and self-perfection. The world, therefore, is from itself perpetual and self-perfect, has an everlasting duration, and on this very account becomes the cause of the permanency of the whole of things.
In short, if the universe should be dissolved, it would either be dissolved into that which has an existence, or into nonentity. But it is impossible that it should be dissolved into that which exists, for there will not be a corruption of the universe if it should be dissolved into that which has a being; for being is either the universe, or a certain part of the universe. Nor can it be dissolved into nonentity, since it is impossible for being either to be produced from non-beings, or to be dissolved into nonentity. The universe, therefore, is incorruptible, and can never be destroyed.
If, nevertheless, some one should think that it may be corrupted, it must either be corrupted from something external to, or contained in the universe, but it cannot be corrupted by anything external to it; for there is not anything external to the universe, since all other things are comprehended in the universe, and the world is the whole and the all. Nor can it be corrupted by the things which it contains, for in this case it will be requisite that these should be greater and more powerful than the universe. This, however, is not true, for all things are led and governed by the universe, and conformably to this are preserved and co-adapted, and possess life and soul. But if the universe can neither be corrupted by anything external to it, nor by anything contained within it, the world must therefore be incorruptible and indestructible; for we consider the world to be the same with the universe.
Further still, the whole of nature surveyed through the whole of itself, will be found to derive continuity from the first and most honourable of bodies, attenuating this continuity proportionally, introducing it to everything mortal, and receiving the progression of its peculiar subsistence; for the first [and most honourable] bodies in the universe, revolve according to the same, and after a similar manner. The progression, however, of the whole of nature, is not successive and continued, nor yet local, but subsists according to mutation.
Fire, indeed, when it is congregated into one thing, generates air, but air generates water, and water earth. From earth, also, there is the same circuit of mutation, as far as to fire, from whence it began to be changed. But fruits, and most plants that derive their origin from a root, receive the beginning of their generation from seeds. When, however, they bear fruit and arrive at maturity, again they are resolved into seed, nature producing a complete circulation from the same to the same.
But men and other animals, in a subordinate degree, change the universal boundary of nature; for in these there is no periodical return to the first age, nor is there an antiperistasis of mutation into each other, as there is in fire and air, water and earth; but the mutations of their ages being accomplished in a four-fold circle, they are dissolved, and again return to existence; these, therefore, are the signs and indications that the universe, which comprehends [all things], will always endure and be preserved, but that its parts, and such things in it as are supervenient, are corrupted and dissolved.
Further still, it is credible that the universe is without a beginning, and without an end, from its figure, from motion, from time, and its essence; and, therefore, it may be concluded that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible: for the form of its figure is circular; but a circle is on all sides similar and equal, and is therefore without a beginning, and without an end. The motion also of the universe is circular, but this motion is stable and without transition. Time, likewise, in which motion exists is infinite, for this neither had a beginning, nor will have an end of its circulation. The essence, too, of the universe, is without egression [into any other place], and is immutable, because it is not naturally adapted to be changed, either from the worse to the better, or from the better to the worse. From all these arguments, therefore, it is obviously credible, that the world is unbegotten and incorruptible. And thus much concerning the whole and the universe.
CHAPTER 2
Since, however, in the universe, one thing is generation, but another the cause of generation; and generation indeed takes place where there is a mutation and an egression from things which rank as subjects; but the cause of generation then subsists where the subject matter remains the same: this being the case, it is evident that the cause of generation possesses both an effective and motive power, but that the recipient of generation is adapted to passivity, and to be moved.
But the Fates themselves distinguish and separate the impassive part of the world from that which is perpetually moved [or mutuable]. For the course of the moon is the isthmus of immortality and generation. The region, indeed, above the moon, and also that which the moon occupies, contain the genus of the gods; but the place beneath the moon is the abode of strife and nature; for in this place there is a mutation of things that are generated, and a regeneration of things which have perished.
In that part of the world, however, in which nature and generation predominate, it is necessary that the three following things should be present. In the first place, the body which yields to the touch, and which is the subject of all generated natures. But this will be an universal recipient, and a signature of generation itself, having the same relation to the things that are generated from it, as water to taste, silence to sound, darkness to light, and the matter of artificial forms to the forms themselves. For water is tasteless and devoid of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet and the bitter, the sharp and the salt. Air, also, which is formless with respect to sound, is the recipient of words and melody. And darkness, which is without colour, and without form, becomes the recipient of splendour, and of the yellow colour and the white; but whiteness pertains to the statuary’s art; and to the art which fashions figures from wax. Matter, however, has a relation in a different manner to the statuary’s art; for in matter all things prior to generation are in capacity, but they exist in perfection when they are generated and receive their proper nature. Hence matter [or a universal recipient] is necessary to the existence of generation.
The second thing which is necessary, is the existence of contrarieties, in order that mutations and changes in quality may be effected, matter for this purpose receiving passive qualities, and an aptitude to the participation of forms. Contrariety is also necessary, in order that powers, which are naturally mutually repugnant, may not finally vanquish, or be vanquished by, each other. But these powers are the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist.
Essences rank in the third place; and these are fire and water, air and earth, of which the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, are powers. But essences differ from powers; for essences are locally corrupted by each other, but powers are neither corrupted nor generated, for the reasons [or forms] of them are incorporeal.
Of these four powers, however, the hot and the cold subsist as causes and things of an effective nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter and things that are passive; but matter is the first recipient of all things, for it is that which is in common spread under all things. Hence, the body, which is the object of sense in capacity, and ranks as a principle, is the first thing; but contrarieties, such as heat and cold, moisture and dryness, form the second thing; and fire and water, earth and air, have an arrangement in the third place. For these change into each other; but things of a contrary nature are without change.
But the differences of bodies are two: for some of them indeed are primary, but others originate from these: for the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, rank as primary differences; but the heavy and the light, the dense and the rare, have the relation of things which are produced from the primary differences. All of them, however, are in number sixteen, viz. the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, the heavy and the light, the rare and the dense, the smooth and the rough, the hard and the soft, the thin and the thick, the acute and the obtuse. But of all these, the touch has a knowledge, and forms a judgement; hence, also, the first body in which these differences exist in capacity, may be sensibly apprehended by the touch.
The hot and the dry, therefore, the rare and the sharp, are the powers of fire; but those of water are, the cold and the moist, the dense and the obtuse; those of air are, the soft, the smooth, the light, and the attenuated; and those of earth are, the hard and the rough, the heavy and the thick.
Of these four bodies, however, fire and earth are the transcendencies and summits [or extremities] of contraries. Fire, therefore, is the transcendency of heat, in the same manner as ice is of cold: hence, if ice is a concretion of moisture and frigidity, fire will be the fervour of dryness and heat. On which account, nothing is generated from ice, nor from fire.
Fire and earth, therefore, are the extremities of the elements, but water and air are the media, for they have a mixed corporeal nature. Nor is it possible that there could be only one of the extremes, but it is necessary that there should be a contrary to it. Nor could there be two only, for it is necessary that there should be a medium, since media are opposite to the extremes.
Fire, therefore, is hot and dry, but air is hot and moist; water is moist and cold, but earth is cold and dry. Hence, heat is common to air and fire; cold is common to water and earth; dryness to earth and fire; and moisture to water and air. But with respect to the peculiarities of each, heat is the peculiarity of fire, dryness of earth, moisture of air, and frigidity of water. The essences, therefore, of these remain permanent, through the possession of common properties; but they change through such as are peculiar, when one contrary vanquishes another.
Hence, when the moisture in air vanquishes the dryness in fire, but the frigidity in water, the heat in air, and the dryness in earth, the moisture in water, and vice versâ, when the moisture in water vanquishes the dryness in earth, the heat in air, the coldness in water, and the dryness in fire, the moisture in air, then the mutations and generations of the elements from each other into each other are effected.
The body, however, which is the subject and recipient of mutations, is a universal receptacle, and is in capacity the first tangible substance.
But the mutations of the elements are effected, either from a change of earth into fire, or from fire into air, or from air into water, or from water into earth. Mutation is also effected in the third place, when that which is contrary in each element is corrupted, but that which is of a kindred nature, and connascent, is preserved. Generation, therefore, is effected, when one contrariety is corrupted. For fire, indeed, is hot and dry, but air is hot and moist, and heat is common to both; but the peculiarity of fire is dryness, and of air moisture. Hence, when the moisture in air vanquishes the dryness in fire, then fire is changed into air.
Again, since water is moist and cold, but air is moist and hot, moisture is common to both. The peculiarity however of water is coldness, but of air heat. When, therefore, the coldness in water vanquishes the heat in air, the mutation from air into water is effected.
Further still, earth is cold and dry, but water is cold and moist, and coldness is common to both; but the peculiarity of earth is dryness, and of water moisture. When, therefore, the dryness in earth vanquishes the moisture in water, a mutation takes place from water into earth.
The mutation, however, from earth, in an ascending progression, is performed in a contrary way; but an alternate mutation is effected when one whole vanquishes another, and two contrary powers are corrupted, nothing at the same time being common to them. For since fire is hot and dry, but water is cold and moist; when the moisture in water vanquishes the dryness in fire, and the coldness in water the heat in fire, then a mutation is effected from fire into water.
Again, earth is cold and dry, but air is hot and moist. When, therefore, the coldness in earth vanquishes the heat in air, and the dryness in earth, the moisture in air, then a mutation from air into earth is effected.
But when the moisture of air corrupts the heat of fire, from both of them fire will be generated; for the heat of air and the dryness of fire will still remain. And fire is hot and dry.
When, however, the coldness of earth is corrupted, and the moisture of water, from both of them earth will be generated. For the dryness of earth, indeed, will be left, and the coldness of water. And earth is cold and dry.
But when the heat of air, and the heat of fire are corrupted, no element will be generated; for the contraries in both these will remain, viz. the moisture of air and the dryness of fire. Moisture, however, is contrary to dryness.
And again, when the coldness of earth, and in a similar manner of water, are corrupted, neither thus will there be any generation; for the dryness of earth and the moisture of water will remain. But dryness is contrary to moisture. And thus, we have briefly discussed the generation of the first bodies, and have shown how and from what subjects it is effected.
Since, however, the world is indestructible and unbegotten, and neither received a beginning of generation, nor will ever have an end, it is necessary that the nature which produces generation in another thing, and also that which generates in itself, should be present with each other. And that, indeed, which produces generation in another thing, is the whole of the region above the moon; but the more proximate cause is the sun, who, by his accessions and recessions, continually changes the air, so as to cause it to be at one time cold, and at another hot; the consequence of which is, that the earth is changed, and everything which the earth contains.
The obliquity of the zodiac, also, is well posited with respect to the motion of the sun, for it likewise is the cause of generation. And universally this is accomplished by the proper order of the universe; so that one thing in it is that which makes, but another that which is passive. Hence, that which generates in another thing, exists above the moon; but that which generates in itself, has a subsistence beneath the moon; and that which consists of both these, viz. of an ever-running divine body, and of an ever-mutable generated nature, is the world.
CHAPTER 3
The origin, however, of the generation of man was not derived from the earth, nor that of other animals, nor of plants; but the proper order of the world being perpetual, it is also necessary that the natures which exist in it, and are aptly arranged, should, together with it, have a never-failing subsistence. For the world primarily always existing, it is necessary that its parts should be co-existent with it: but I mean by its parts, the heavens, the earth, and that which subsists between these; which is placed on high, and is denominated aerial; for the world does not exist without, but together with, and from these.
The parts of the world, however, being consubsistent, it is also necessary that the natures, comprehended in these parts, should be co-existent with them; with the heavens, indeed, the sun and moon, the fixed stars, and the planets; but with the earth, animals and plants, gold and silver; with the place on high, and the aerial region, pneumatic substances and wind, a mutation to that which is more hot, and a mutation to that which is more cold; for it is the property of the heavens to subsist in conjunction with the natures which it comprehends; of the earth to support the plants and animals which originate from it; and of the place on high, and the aerial region, to be consubsistent with all the natures that are generated in it.
Since, therefore, in each division of the world, a certain genus of animals is arranged, which surpasses the rest contained in that division; in the heavens, indeed, the genus of the gods, but in the earth men, and in the region on high demons;—this being the case, it is necessary that the race of men should be perpetual, since reason truly induces us to believe, that not only the [great] parts of the world are consubsistent with the world, but also the natures comprehended in these parts.
Violent corruptions, however, and mutations, take place in the parts of the earth; at one time, indeed, the sea overflowing into another part of the earth; but at another, the earth itself becoming dilated and divulsed, through wind or water latently entering into it. But an entire corruption of the arrangement of the whole earth never did happen, nor ever will.
Hence the assertion, that the Grecian history derived its beginning from the Argive Inachus, must not be admitted as if it commenced from a certain first principle, but that it originated from some mutation which happened in Greece; for Greece has frequently been, and will again be, barbarous, not only from the migration of foreigners into it, but from nature herself, which, though she does not become greater or less, yet is always younger, and with reference to us, receives a beginning.
And thus much has been sufficiently said by me respecting the whole and the universe; and further still, concerning the generation and corruption of the natures which are generated in it, and the manner in which they subsist, and will for ever subsist; one part of the universe consisting of a nature which is perpetually moved, but another part of a nature which is always passive; and the former of these always governing, but the latter being always governed.
CHAPTER 4
Concerning the generation of men, however, from each other, after what manner, and from what particulars, it may be most properly effected, law, and temperance and piety at the same time co-operating, will be, I think, as follows. In the first place, indeed, this must be admitted,—that we should not be connected with women for the sake of pleasure, but for the sake of begetting children.
For those powers and instruments, and appetites, which are subservient to copulation, were imparted to men by Divinity, not for the sake of voluptuousness, but for the sake of the perpetual duration of the human race. For since it was impossible that man, who is born mortal, should participate of a divine life, if the immortality of his genus was corrupted; Divinity gave completion to this immortality through individuals, and made this generation of mankind to be unceasing and continued. This, therefore, is one of the first things which it is necessary to survey,—that copulation should not be undertaken for the sake of voluptuous delight.
In the next place, the co-ordination itself of man should be considered with reference to the whole, viz. that he is a part of a house and a city, and (which is the greatest thing of all) that each of the progeny of the human species ought to give completion to the world, if it does not intend to be a deserter either of the domestic, or political, or divine Vestal hearth.
For those who are not entirely connected with each other for the sake of begetting children, injure the most honourable system of convention. But if persons of this description procreate with libidinous insolence and intemperance, their offspring will be miserable and flagitious, and will be execrated by gods and demons, and by men, and families, and cities.
Those, therefore, who deliberately consider these things, ought not, in a way similar to irrational animals, to engage in venereal connections, but should think copulation to be a necessary good. For it is the opinion of worthy men, that it is necessary and beautiful, not only to fill houses with large families, and also the greater part of the earth, (for man is the most mild and the best of all animals,) but, as a thing of the greatest consequence, to cause them to abound with the most excellent men.
For on this account men inhabit cities governed by the best laws, rightly manage their domestic affairs, and [if they are able] impart to their friends such political employments as are conformable to the polities in which they live, since they not only provide for the multitude at large, but [especially] for worthy men.
Hence, many err, who enter into the connubial state without regarding the magnitude of [the power of] fortune, or public utility, but direct their attention to wealth, or dignity of birth. For in consequence of this, instead of uniting with females who are young and in the flower of their age, they become connected with extremely old women; and instead of having wives with a disposition according with, and most similar to their own, they marry those who are of an illustrious family, or are extremely rich. On this account, they procure for themselves discord instead of concord; and instead of unanimity, dissention; contending with each other for the mastery. For the wife who surpasses her husband in wealth, in birth, and in friends, is desirous of ruling over him, contrary to the law of nature. But the husband justly resisting this desire of superiority in his wife, and wishing not to be the second, but the first in domestic sway, is unable, in the management of his family, to take the lead.
This being the case, it happens that not only families, but cities, become miserable. For families are parts of cities, but the composition of the whole and the universe derives its subsistence from parts. It is reasonable, therefore, to admit, that such as are the parts, such likewise will be the whole and the all which consists of things of this kind.
And as in fabrics of a primary nature the first structures co-operate greatly to the good or bad completion of the whole work; as, for instance, the manner in which the foundation is laid in building a house, the structure of the keel in building a ship, and in musical modulation the extension and remission of the voice; so the concordant condition of families greatly contributes to the well or ill establishment of a polity.
Those, therefore, who direct their attention to the propagation of the human species, ought to guard against everything which is dissimilar and imperfect; for neither plants nor animals, when imperfect, are prolific, but to their fructification a certain portion of time is necessary, in order that when the bodies are strong and perfect, they may produce seeds and fruits.
Hence, it is necessary that boys, and girls also while they are virgins, should be trained up in exercises and proper endurance, and that they should be nourished with that kind of food, which is adapted to a laborious, temperate, and patient life.
Moreover, there are many things in human life of such a kind, that it is better for the knowledge of them to be deferred for a certain time. Hence, it is requisite that a boy should be so tutored, as not to seek after venereal pleasures before he is twenty years of age, and then should rarely engage in them. This, however, will take place, if he conceives that a good habit of body, and continence, are beautiful and honourable.
It is likewise requisite that such legal institutes as the following should be taught in Grecian cities, viz. that connection with a mother, or a daughter, or a sister, should not be permitted either in temples, or in a public place; for it is beautiful and advantageous that numerous impediments to this energy should be employed.
And universally, it is requisite that all preternatural generations should be prevented, and those which are attended with wanton insolence. But such as are conformable to nature should be admitted, and which are effected with temperance, for the purpose of producing a temperate and legitimate offspring.
Again, it is necessary that those who intend to beget children, should providentially attend to the welfare of their future offspring. A temperate and salutary diet, therefore, is the first and greatest thing which should be attended to by him who wishes to beget children; so that he should neither be filled with unseasonable food, nor become intoxicated, nor subject himself to any other perturbation, from which the habits of the body may become worse. But, above all things, it is requisite to be careful that the mind, in the act of copulation, should be in a tranquil state: for, from depraved, discordant, and turbulent habits, bad seed is produced.
It is requisite, therefore, to endeavour, with all possible earnestness and attention, that children may be born elegant and graceful, and that when born, they should be well educated. For neither is it just that those who rear horses, or birds, or dogs, should, with the utmost diligence, endeavour that the breed may be such as is proper, and from such things as are proper, and when it is proper; and likewise consider how they ought to be disposed when they copulate with each other, in order that the offspring may not be a casual production;—but that men should pay no attention to their progeny, but should beget them casually; and when begotten, should neglect both their nutriment and their education: for these being disregarded, the causes of all vice and depravity are produced, since those that are thus born will resemble cattle, and will be ignoble and vile.
OCELLUS LUCANUS ON LAWS.
A FRAGMENT PRESERVED BY STOBÆUS, ECLOG. PHYS. LIB. I. CAP. 16.
Life, connectedly—contains in itself bodies; but of this, soul is the cause. Harmony comprehends, connectedly, the world; but of this, God is the cause. Concord binds together families and cities; and of this, law is the cause. Hence, there is a certain cause and nature which perpetually adapts the parts of the world to each other, and never suffers them to be disorderly and without connection. Cities, however, and families, continue only for a short time; the progeny of which, and the mortal nature of the matter of which they consist, contain in themselves the cause of dissolution; for they derive their subsistence from a mutable and perpetually passive nature. For the destruction of things which are generated, is the salvation of the matter from which they are generated. That nature, however, which is perpetually moved governs, but that which is always passive is governed; and the one is in capacity prior, but the other posterior. The one also is divine, and possesses reason and intellect, but the other is generated, and is irrational and mutable.
FRAGMENTS OF TAURUS,
A PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER,
ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD.
EXTRACTED FROM PHILOPONUS AGAINST PROCLUS.
Taurus, in his Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato, says: “In the investigation, whether according to Plato the world is unbegotten, philosophers differ in their opinions. For Aristotle asserts that Timæus says the world was generated. And Theophrastus also, in his treatise On Physical Opinions, says that, according to Plato, the world was generated, and therefore writes in opposition to him. At the same time, however, he asserts that Timæus perhaps supposed the world to be generated, for the sake of perspicuity. Certain other persons also infer, that, according to Plato, the world was generated. But, again, others contend that Plato believed the world to be unbegotten. Since, however, those who assert that the world was generated, cite many other words of Plato, and likewise the passage in which Plato says, ‘the world was generated, for it is visible and tangible;’ this being the case, it is requisite to direct our attention to the different ways in which a thing is said to be generated, and thus we shall know that Plato asserts the world to be generated, not according to the signification in which we affirm this of things which derive their subsistence from a certain temporal beginning. For this it is which deceives the multitude, when they conceive the word generated to imply a temporal origin. A thing, therefore, is said to be generated, which never indeed had a beginning in time, but yet is in the same genus with generated natures. Thus we call a thing visible, which is not seen, nor has been seen, nor will be seen, but yet is in the same genus with things of a visible nature. And this will take place with a body which may exist about the centre of the earth. That also is said to be generated, which, in mental conception, subsists as a composite, though it never has been a composite. Thus, in music, the middle chord is said to be composed of the lowest and highest chord. For though it is not thus composed, yet there is perceived in it the power of the one with reference to the other. The like also takes place in flowers and animals. In the world, therefore, composition and mixture are perceived; according to which, we are able to withdraw and separate qualities from it, and resolve it into a first subject. The world also is said to be generated, because it always subsists in becoming to be, like Proteus changing into all-various forms; hence, with respect to the world, the earth, and the natures, as far as to the moon, are continually changed into each other. But the natures above the moon are as to their subject nearly the same, sustaining only a small mutation. They change, however, according to figure; just as a dancer being one and the same according to subject, is changed into various forms by a certain gesture and motion of the hands. The celestial bodies, therefore, are thus changed, and different habitudes of them take place, between the motions of the planets with reference to the fixed stars, and of the fixed stars with respect to the planets.
“The world, likewise, may be said to be generated, because it derives its existence from something different from itself, viz. from God, by whom it is adorned. Thus, also, with those who directly admit that the world is perpetual, the moon possesses a generated light from the sun, though there never was a time when the former was not illuminated by the latter. If, therefore, some one asserts that the world is generated according to Plato, conformably to these significations of the word, what he says may be admitted. But so far as the term ‘generated’ signifies a certain time, and that the world, formerly not existing, was afterwards generated, this signification, when applied to the world, must by no means be granted. Plato himself, indeed, indicates how what he asserts is to be understood, when he says, ‘It must be investigated, whether the universe always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was generated, commencing its generation from a certain cause.’ For the words, ‘no principle whatever,’ and ‘from a certain cause,’ manifest he does not intend that a temporal principle should be assumed; but that what he says, is to be understood in the same way, as when we say that the history of the Ephori commenced in the descendants of Hercules. Others say, that the world had a beginning from the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus is a principle, and so likewise is the paradigm of the universe, and matter. But matter cannot be properly said to be a principle. Again, Plato does not say that the world is a body, but that it has a body; indicating by this, that so far as it possesses a corporeal nature, the very being of which consists in becoming to be, it may be said to be generated.”
Again, Taurus, in the same Commentaries on the Timæus, having cited the following passage from that dialogue, viz. “We who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it is generated, or without generation,” observes: “Plato says this, though the world is unbegotten.
And the poet,
‘Though in their race posterior found,’
Plato, however, for the sake of discipline, speaks of the world which is unbegotten, as if it was generated.” Shortly after this, Taurus says, “What, therefore, are the causes through which the world being unbegotten, is supposed to be generated?” Both these inquiries, indeed, deserve to be philosophically investigated. For one of them excites to piety, but the other is assumed for the sake of elucidation. For Plato, knowing that the multitude apprehend that alone to be a cause which has a precedency in time, and not conceiving it to be possible for anything otherwise to be a cause, and also inferring, that, from this opinion, they might be led to disbelieve in the existence of Providence; wishing likewise to inculcate this dogma, that the world is governed by Providence, he tacitly manifests it to those who are abundantly able to understand that the world is unbegotten according to time; but to those who are not able to understand this, he indicates that it is generated. He is also anxious that they may believe this, in order that at the same time they may be persuaded in the existence of Providence. But the second cause which induced Plato thus to write, is this,—that assertions are then more clear, when we meet with them as with things which actually take place. Thus geometricians compose diagrams as if they were generated, though they are not composites. And Euclid defines a circle, as being more simple, to be a plane figure, comprehended under one line, to which all lines falling from one point within the figure are equal to each other. But wishing to explain a sphere, he defines it, as if it was among the number of things generated, to be formed by the revolution of a semicircle about the diameter, until it returns to the same point from which it began to be moved. If, however, he had intended to explain the sphere which already existed, he would have defined it to be a solid figure, comprehended under one superficies, to which all right lines falling from one point within the figure, are equal to each other. But it was usual with Plato, for the sake of discipline, to unfold things which are without generation, as if they were generated. Thus, in the Republic, he introduces the city as being made, in order that in the formation of it, the generation of justice might become more manifest. When, however, Theophrastus says, that perhaps Plato speaks of the world as generated for the sake of elucidation, just as we consider geometrical diagrams to be generated, perhaps generation does not subsist similarly in diagrams. Aristotle also asserts the same thing; for he says, that in diagrams it is not proper in the beginning to suppose contraries, but this is to be admitted in the generation of the world; just as if some one should suppose motion and rest, order and disorder. Neither, therefore, do all things require invariable paradigms; but the examples show that it is not more obvious to assert that the world is generated, than that it is unbegotten. But how is it possible to suppose contraries in diagrams? For can it be supposed that a triangle is at one and the same time stationary and moved? Hence, the world is, according to itself, unbegotten. Nor should any one fatigue himself in endeavouring to prove from the Atlanticus and Politicus of Plato, that the world is generated. For we have shown after what manner the world is unbegotten, and how it is said by Plato to be generated. So far, therefore, as it is supposed to be generated, it will be incorruptible through the will of God; but so far as it is unbegotten, it will be incorruptible from its own nature. And this Plato knew. For everything else that is unbegotten, is incorruptible.”
MUNDI THEMA,
OR
THE GENITURE OF THE WORLD.
TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD BOOK OF THE MATHESIS OF JULIUS FIRMICUS MATERNUS.
“O Lollianus, the glory and ornament of our country, it is requisite to know, in the first place, that the God, who is the fabricator of man, produced his form, his condition, and his whole essence, in the image and similitude of the world, nature pointing out the way. For he composed the body of man, as well as of the world, from the mixture of the four elements, viz. of fire, water, air, and earth, in order that the conjunction of all these, when they were mingled in due proportion, might adorn an animal in the form of a divine imitation. And thus the Demiurgus exhibited man by the artifice of a divine fabrication, in such a way, that in a small body he might bestow the power and essence of all the elements, nature, for this purpose, bringing them together; and also, so that from the divine spirit, which descended from a celestial intellect, to the support of the mortal body, he might prepare an abode for man, which, though fragile, might be similar to the world. On this account, the five stars, and also the sun and moon, sustain man by a fiery and eternal agitation, as if he were a minor world; so that the animal which was made in imitation of the world might be governed by an essence similarly divine. Hence those divine men Petosiris and Necepso, who deserve all possible admiration, and whose wisdom approached to the very penetralia of Deity, scientifically delivered to us the geniture of the world, that they might demonstrate and show that man was fashioned conformably to the nature and similitude of the world, and that he is under the dominion of the same principles by which the world itself is governed and contained, and is perennially supported by the companions of perpetuity.
“According to Æsculapius, therefore, and Anubius, to whom especially the divinity Mercury committed the secrets of the astrological science, the geniture of the world is as follows: They constituted the Sun in the 15th part of Leo, the Moon in the 15th part of Cancer, Saturn in the 15th part of Capricorn, Jupiter in the 15th part of Sagittary, Mars in the 15th part of Scorpio, Venus in the 15th part of Libra, Mercury in the 15th part of Virgo, and the Horoscope in the 15th part of Cancer. Conformably to this geniture, therefore, to these conditions of the stars, and the testimonies which they adduce in confirmation of this geniture, they are of opinion that the destinies of men, also, are disposed in accordance with the above arrangement, as may be learnt from that book of Æsculapius which is called Μυριογενεσις, (i. e. Ten Thousand, or an innumerable multitude of Genitures,) in order that nothing in the several genitures of men may be found to be discordant with the above-mentioned geniture of the world.
“We may see, therefore, how far or after what manner a star accommodates the testimony of its radiation to the luminaries. For the luminaries are the Sun and Moon. But Saturn first conjoins himself with the Moon: for he follows the condition of the Moon. He does this, however, because, being constituted in a feminine sign, he diametrically receives the rays of the Moon, which is also constituted in a feminine sign. But when the same Saturn, in that geniture, makes a transition to the sign Aquarius, he again conjoins himself to the Sun by a similar radiation, and is again disposed in the same condition as that of the Sun. For being constituted in a masculine sign, he associates himself by an equal testimony of radiation, since he diametrically looks towards the Sun, with a radiation similar to that with which he regards the Moon. After this manner also Jupiter is constituted in Sagittary, and through a trigon affording a testimony to the Sun, first conjoins himself to his condition, and on this account being constituted in a masculine sign, and associating with the Sun, who is constituted in a sign of the same kind, first follows the power of it; but when he has made a transition to Pisces, he again conjoins himself in a like condition to the Moon. For he, in a similar manner, being posited through a trigon in a feminine sign, looks towards the Moon, who is constituted in a sign of the same kind, with an equal radiation of condition.
“In like manner also the planet Mars, being constituted in Scorpio, because he is in a feminine sign, through a trigon, affords a testimony to the Moon; but when he comes to Aries, he affords a testimony to the Sun, and making a transition, being placed in a masculine sign, he conjoins himself by a trigonic radiation with the Sun. This mode, however, is changeable; for Mars being constituted in Libra, which is a masculine sign, yet he affords a testimony to the Moon through a square aspect; but when he has made a transition to Taurus, being constituted in a feminine sign, and looking towards the Sun by a square radiation, he again affords a testimony to it. These [divine] men, however, were of opinion that the planet Mercury is common in the above-mentioned geniture, this star affording no testimony either to the Sun or Moon by a square, or a trigon, or a diameter; nor does it conjoin itself by radiation either with the Sun or Moon. But if Mercury is a morning star, he is delighted by day with the Sun, but if an evening star, by night with the Moon. All that we have here said, these men were of opinion ought to be observed in the genitures of men, and thought that they could not discover the destiny of man, except those radiations were collected by a sagacious investigation. Lest, however, the fabulous device of these men should deceive you, and lest some one should think that this geniture of the world was contrived by these most wise men, without a cause, it is requisite that we should explain all things particularly, in order that the great sagacity displayed in this device, may, by the most diligent expositions, be intimated to all men.
“The world had not a certain day of its origin, nor was there any time in which the world was formed by the counsel of a divine intellect, and providential Deity; nor has the eager desire of human fragility been able to extend itself so far as to conceive or explain the origin of the world, especially since the greater apocatastasis of it, which is effected by a conflagration or a deluge, consists of 300,000 years[c]. For the mundane apocatastasis is accustomed to be accomplished by these two events; since a deluge follows a conflagration, because substances which are burnt can no otherwise be renovated and restored to their pristine appearance and form, than by the admixtions and the concrete dust of the ashes, which are a collection of generative seeds becoming prolific. Divine men, therefore, following the example of mathematicians in the genitures of men, have prudently devised this, as if it were the geniture of the world. Hence I deem it expedient to explain the contrivance of that divine composition, in order that the admirable reason of the conjectural scheme may be unfolded according to the rules of art.
“These divine men, therefore, wished so to constitute the Moon [in the geniture of the world], that it might conjoin itself with Saturn, and might deliver the dominion of periodical revolutions. Nor was this improperly devised. For because the first origin of the world [i. e. the beginning of the first mundane period] was uncultivated and rude, and savage through rustic association, and also because barbarous men, having entered on the first vestiges of light, and which were unknown to them, were destitute of reason, in consequence of having abandoned humanity, these divine men were of opinion, that this rustic and barbarous time was Saturnian, that, in imitation of this star, the beginning of life might be characterized by barbaric and inhuman ferocity. After Saturn, Jupiter received periodical power. For to this planet the Moon was conjoined in the second place, in order that pristine and squalid rusticity being deserted, and the ferocity of rude association being laid aside, human life might be cultivated through the purification of the manners. In the third place, the Moon conjoining herself with Mars, delivered to him the power of periodical revolution; so that mortality having entered into the right path of life, and inhumanity being subdued by a certain moderation, all the ornaments of arts and fabrications might originate from this conjunction. After Mars, Venus received predominating power, in order that, human disciplines gradually increasing, prudence and wisdom might adorn mankind. Hence they were of opinion that this time, in which the manners of men were cultivated by learning, and naturally formed to rectitude by the several disciplines, was under the dominion of Venus; so that being protected by the majesty of this joyful and salutary divinity, they might govern their erroneous actions by the ruling power of Providence. But [these divine men] conceived the last period to be under the dominion of Mercury, to whom the Moon in the last place conjoins herself. What can be found more subtle than this arrangement? For mankind being purified from rude and savage pursuits, arts also having been invented, and disciplines disposed in an orderly manner, the human race sharpened its inventive power. And because the noble genius in man could not preserve [uniformly] one course of life, the improbity of evil increased from various institutes, and confused manners and the crimes of a life of wickedness prevailed: hence the human race in this period both invented and delivered to others more enormous machinations. On this account these wise men thought that this last period should be assigned to Mercury, so that, in imitation of that star, the human race might give birth to inventions replete with evil.
“That nothing, however, may be omitted by us requisite to the elucidation of this subject, all things are to be explained, which prove that man was formed in the imitation and similitude of the world. And that the mundane apocatastasis is effected through a conflagration and a deluge, we also have asserted, and is confirmed by all men. The substance likewise of the human body, the course of life having received its completion, is, after a similar manner, dissolved. For as often as, through the natural ardour of heat, the human body is too much relaxed, it evaporates in consequence of the inundations of humours; and thus it always suffers a decoction from a fiery ardour, or is dissolved by excessive desudation. Nor do the wisest interpreters of the medical art assert, that the substance of the human race is dissolved by a natural termination in any other way, than by either moisture dissolving fire, or again heat predominating, fire being inwardly and deeply extinguished, is left without moisture. Thus the artificer, Nature, constituted man in an all-various imitation of the world, so that whatever dissolves, or forms the essence of the world, this also should be the cause of the formation and dissolution of man.”
SELECT THEOREMS
IN PROOF OF
THE PERPETUITY OF TIME,
AND OF THAT WHICH IS NATURALLY MOVED WITH A CIRCULAR MOTION.
EXTRACTED FROM THE SECOND BOOK OF PROCLUS ON MOTION.
HYPOTHESES.
Every natural body is moveable according to place.
Every local motion is either in a circle, or in a right line, or mixed from these.
Every natural body is moved according to one of these motions.
Every natural body is either simple or compounded.
Every simple motion is the motion of a simple body.
Every simple body is moved with one motion according to nature.
DEFINITIONS.
That is heavy which is moved towards the middle.
That is light which is moved from the middle.
That is said to be moved in a circle which is continually borne from the same to the same.
Contrary motions are from contraries to contraries.
One motion is contrary to one.
Time is the number of the motion of the celestial bodies.
The motion is one which is without difference according to species, and belongs to one subject, and is produced in a continued time.
THEOREM 1.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle are simple.
Demonstration.—Let AB be that which is naturally moved in a circle. I say that AB is simple: for, since the motion in a circle is a simple motion; but every simple motion is the motion of a simple body; hence AB is a simple body. Things, therefore, which are naturally moved in a circle are simple.
THEOREM 2.
Things naturally moved in a circle, are neither the same with those moved in a right line, nor with those which are composed from things moved in a right line.
Demonstration.—Let AB be that which is naturally moved in a circle. I say that it is not the same with those things which are moved in a right line. For, if it is the same with any one of these, it must either be naturally moved upwards or downwards. But every simple body is moved with one simple motion according to nature. Hence, that which is naturally moved in a circle, is not the same with anything moved in a right line. But neither is it the same with anything compounded. For it has been shown that everything which naturally moves in a circle is simple; but that which consists from things moved in a right line is a composite. AB therefore, which is naturally moved in a circle, is neither the same with things moved in a right line, nor with those composed from these.
THEOREM 3.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle, neither participate of gravity nor levity.
Demonstration.—For if AB is either heavy or light, it is either naturally moved to the middle, or from the middle: for, from the definitions, that is heavy which is moved to the middle, and that is light which is moved from the middle. But that which is moved either from or to the middle, is the same with some one of the things moved in a right line. AB, therefore, is the same with something moved in a right line, though naturally moved in a circle, which is impossible.
THEOREM 4.
Nothing is contrary to a circular motion.
Demonstration.—For if this be possible, let the motion from A to B be a circular motion, and let the motion contrary to this be either some one of the motions in a right line, or some one of those in a circle. If, then, the motion upwards is contrary to that in a circle, the motion downwards and that in a circle will be one. But if the motion downwards is contrary to that in a circle, the motion upwards and that in a circle will be the same with each other; for one motion is contrary to one into opposite places. But if the motion from A is contrary to the motion from B, there will be infinite spaces between two contraries; for between the points A, B infinite circumferences may be described. But let AB be a semicircle, and let the motion from A to B be contrary to the motion from B to A. If, therefore, that which moves in the semicircle from A to B stops at B, it is by no means a motion in a circle: for a circular motion is continually from the same to the same point. But, if it does not stop at B, but continually moves in the other semicircle, A is not contrary to B. And if this be the case, neither is the motion from A to B contrary to the motion from B to A: for contrary motions are from contraries to contraries. But let ABCD be a circle, and let the motion from A to C be contrary to the motion from C to A. If therefore that which is moved from A passes through all the places similarly, and there is one motion from A to D, C is not contrary to A. But if these are not contrary, neither are the motions from them contrary. And in a similar manner with respect to that which is moved from C, if it is moved with one motion to B, A is not contrary to C, so that neither will the motions from these be contrary.
THEOREM 5.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle, neither receive generation nor corruption.
Demonstration.—For let AB be that which is naturally moved in a circle, I say that AB is without generation and corruption: for if it is generable and corruptible, it is generated from a contrary, and is corrupted into a contrary. But that which is moved in a circle has not any contrary. It is therefore without generation and corruption. But that there is nothing contrary to things naturally moving in a circle, is evident from what has been previously demonstrated: for the motions of things contrary according to nature are contrary. But, as we have demonstrated, there is nothing contrary to the motion in a circle. Neither, therefore, has that which is moved in a circle any contrary.
THEOREM 6.
The powers of bodies terminated according to magnitude are not infinite.
Demonstration.—For, if possible, let B be the infinite power of the finite body A; and let the half of A be taken, which let be C, and let the power of this be D. But it is necessary that the power D should be less than the power B: for a part has a power less than that of the whole. Let the ratio, therefore, of C to A be taken, and D will measure B. The power B therefore is finite, and it is as C to A, so D to B; and alternately as C to D, so A to B. But the power D is the power of the magnitude C, and therefore B will be the power of the magnitude A. The magnitude A, therefore, has a finite power B; but it was infinite, which is impossible: for, that a power of the same species should be both finite and infinite in the same thing, is impossible.
THEOREM 7.
Simple bodies are terminated according to species.
Demonstration.—For let the magnitude A be a simple body. Since, therefore, a simple body is moved with a simple motion, A will be moved with a simple motion. And if it is moved in a circle, it will have one nature and one form. But if it is moved according to any one of the motions in a right line, if it is moved from the middle only, it will be fire, but if only to the middle, earth. But, if it is light with respect to one thing, and heavy with respect to another, it will be some one of the middle elements. The species therefore of simple bodies are terminated.
THEOREM 8.
Time is continued and perpetual.
Demonstration.—For, if it is neither continued nor eternal, it will have a certain beginning. Let, therefore, A B be time, and let its beginning be A. But if A is time, it is divisible, and we shall not yet have the beginning of time, but there will be another beginning of the beginning. But, if A is a moment or the now, it will be indivisible, and the boundary of another time: for the now is not only a beginning, but an end. There will therefore be time before A. Again: if B is the boundary of time, if B is time, it may be divided to infinity, and into the many boundaries which it contains. But if B is the now, the same will also be a beginning: for the now is not only a boundary, but a beginning.
THEOREM 9.
A motion which is naturally circular is perpetual.
Demonstration.—Let the circular motion be that of the circle A B, I say that it is perpetual: for, since time is perpetual, it is also necessary that motion should be perpetual. And since time is continued, (for there is the same now in the past and present time,) it is necessary that there should be some one continued motion: for time is the number of motion. However, all other motions are not perpetual: for they are generated from contraries into contraries. A circular motion, therefore, is alone perpetual: for to this, as we have demonstrated, nothing is contrary. But that all the motions which subsist between contraries, are bounded, and are not perpetual, we thus demonstrate. Let A B be a motion between the two contraries A and B. The motion, therefore, of A B is bounded by A and B, and is not infinite. But the motion from A is not continued with that from B. But, when that which is moved returns, it will stand still in B: for, if the motion from A is one continued motion, and also that from B, that which is moved from B will be moved into the same. It will therefore be moved in vain, being now in A. But nature does nothing in vain: and hence, there is not one motion. The motions, therefore, between contraries are not perpetual. Nor is it possible for a thing to be moved to infinity in a right line: for contraries are the boundaries. Nor when it returns will it make one motion.
THEOREM 10.
That which moves a perpetual motion is perpetual.
Demonstration.—For let A be that which moves a perpetual motion. I say that A also is perpetual: for, if it is not, it will not then move when it is not. But this not moving, neither does the motion subsist, which it moved before. It is however supposed to be perpetual. But, nothing else moving, that will be immoveable which is perpetually moved. And if anything else moves when A is no more, the motion is not continual; which is impossible. Hence, that which moves a perpetual motion is itself perpetual.
THEOREM 11.
That which is immoveable is the leader of things moving and moved.
Demonstration.—For let A be moved by B, and B by C, I say that this will some time or other stop, and that not everything which moves will be itself moved: for, if possible, let this take place. Motions, therefore, are either in a circle, or ad infinitum. But, if things moving and moved are infinite, there will be infinite multitude and magnitude: for everything which is moved is divisible, and moves from contact. Hence, that which consists from things moving and moved infinite in multitude, will be infinite in magnitude. But it is impossible that any body, whether composite or simple, can be infinite. But if motions are in a circle, some one of things moved at a certain time, will be the cause of perpetual motion, if all things move and are moved by each other in a circle. This, however, is impossible: for that which moves a perpetual motion is perpetual. Neither, therefore, is the motion of things moved, in a circle, nor ad infinitum. There is, therefore, that which moves immoveably, and which is perpetual.
But from hence it is evident, that all things are not moved; for there is also something which is immoveable. Nor are all things at rest; for there are also things which are moved. Nor are some things always at rest, but others always moved; for there are also things which are sometimes at rest, and sometimes moved, such as are things which are moved from contraries into contraries. Nor are all things sometimes at rest, and sometimes moved; for there is that which is perpetually moved, and also that which is perpetually immoveable.
THEOREM 12.
Everything which is moved, is moved by something.
Demonstration.—Let A be that which is moved, I say that A is moved by something: for it is either moved according or contrary to nature. If, therefore, it is moved according to nature, that which moves is nature; but, if contrary to nature, that which employs violence moves; for every motion contrary to nature is violent.
THEOREM 13.
That which first moves a circular motion is impartible, or without parts.
Demonstration.—For let A be that which moves the first motion: for it is necessary that there should be something of this kind, because everything which is moved is moved by something. But A, if it is that which first moves, will be immoveable: for that which is immoveable is the leader of all things which are moved. And, since it moves a perpetual motion, it will possess an infinite power of moving; for finite powers have also finite energies: for energy proceeds from power. So that if its energy is infinite, its power also will be infinite. Hence, that which first moves a circular motion, must necessarily either be body, or incorporeal. But if body, it is either finite or infinite. There is not however an infinite body. And if it is a finite body, it will not possess an infinite power. But the powers of things bounded according to magnitude are finite, as has been demonstrated. Hence, that which first moves a circular motion, is not a body. It is therefore incorporeal, and possesses infinite power.